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The Lehman Sisters Hypothesis: an Exploration of Literature and Bankers 
 
Abstract 
This article tests the Lehman Sisters Hypothesis in two complementary, although incomplete ways. It 
reviews the diverse empirical literature in behavioral, experimental, and neuroeconomics as well as 
related fields of behavioral research. And it presents the findings from an explorative survey among 
Dutch financial professionals. The conclusion is that both methods find support for the Lehman Sisters 
Hypothesis. It shows that gender stereotypes are still influential, constraining women to achieve top 
positions in banking. At the same time, the analysis indicates that women perform better than men in 
finance and that female leaders have more balanced management skills than men and are rated as better 
leaders. This would plea for having more rather than less women at the top of the financial sector. 
 
Introduction 
When the financial crisis broke out with the fall of Lehman Brothers, some commentators drew 
attention to the behavioral aspects of bankers. One way in which this was done was by suggesting that it 
is particularly masculine behavior, largely exhibited by male bankers, that is responsible for the high-
risk-lobby-for-less-regulation-perverse-incentive nexus behind the crisis. EU commissioners Neelie 
Kroes and Viviane Reding as well as former UK Minister Harriet Harman phrased this masculine nexus 
as the Lehman Sisters thesis. In this paper, I will discuss the empirical literature that relates to this thesis 
suggesting that with more women in the top of banking, we would not have had this crisis. I will 
illustrate my discussion with the results from an exploratory survey that I have carried out among 
financial sector professionals in The Netherlands. The objective of the empirical analysis is not a robust 
testing of the hypothesis, which would require an extensive longitudinal empirical study among men 
and women in the financial sector with all the necessary control variables. Instead, my analysis seeks to 
understand the three major nature-nurture dimensions underlying the Lehman Sisters Hypothesis (LSH), 
which makes it such an appealing as well as contested thesis in public debate. These three dimensions 
are risk attitude, rules and responsibility, and leadership. 
Before going into the LSH, it is useful to briefly review the male/female ratio in banking. The 
World Economic Forum’s gender report for 2010 indicates that only 2% of CEO’s in the Financial 
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Services & Insurance industry in 20 surveyed countries is female, as compared to 6% for all industries 
(Zahidi and Ibarra, 2010). Nevertheless, women have been playing an active role in finance for 
centuries. In the UK, for example, in the year 1840, women held 40% of governments stocks 
(Rutterford and Maltby, 2006). In terms of employees, the financial sector has been feminizing for quite 
some time, with an increasing share of women in face-to-face jobs in banks, insurance companies, and 
in personalized areas such as wealth management. But not only at the top of finance the share of women 
is very low, also in the types of functions where most money can be made and where least human 
contact is involved men dominate: in trading, fund management, and in the financial whizz-kid 
activities such as developing derivatives and securities. In the US, about 10% of fund managers are 
women while only 3% of managers of hedge funds are women (NCRW, 2009). These vertical and 
horizontal forms of gender segmentation in the financial sector follow the stereotype gender segregation 
lines in other sectors of the economy: the glass ceiling for top positions in any sector and the 
feminization of service jobs and other jobs in which communication and human interaction is important, 
such as in education and health care. The explanations for the segmentation in finance are similar to 
those of gender-segmentation in other sectors: old boy’s networks, the gender division of labour in the 
household making women more responsible for housework and childcare than men, career breaks due to 
pregnancy and maternal leave, and prejudice against female leadership qualities and financial skills 
(NCRW, 2009). What makes finance an even more male-dominated sector than other sectors will be 
clarified with the analysis of the LSH in the remainder of this paper. 
This requires one important note, however, namely that the women who work in the finance 
industry are self-selected into a men’s world, in which stereotype masculine characteristics are highly 
valued. Hence, it is likely that most of the women in the top of banks, funds, and regulatory bodies have 
been socialized into attitudes that we find on average more with men than with women, and that they are 
professionals who like the abstract, risky, and highly rewarded tasks of financial decision making. This 
self-selection mechanism does not support the LSH but instead makes it more likely that women who 
choose to work in finance behave on average more like men, in particular like men choosing a 
profession in finance
1
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An exploratory survey among Dutch financial professionals 
The dataset contains survey information of 111 financial professionals in the Netherlands, of which 74 
(66.7%) women and 37 (33.3%) men. The online survey was carried out in the period December 2010-
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January 2011, using NetQ. The data were analyzed using SPSS with Pearson’s Chi square tests for testing 
male-female differences. The sample size as well as the sex ratio is not representative for the financial 
sector in the Netherlands. The reason is that the sample was drawn through an online survey posted on 
LinkedIn, using the snowball method starting from a women financial professionals’ network, which 
showed interest in the survey. The results should therefore be interpreted as exploratory. The value of the 
survey lies in the exploration of the implied LSH differences in attitudes and views of financial behaviour 
and governance between men and women during the financial crisis. Before going into the three LSH 
dimensions, I will first give the descriptive statistics on the basic characteristics of the male and female 
participants of the survey. 
Table 1 shows that men are older than women on average, and the difference is statistically 
significant. Obviously, this difference is likely to contribute to a gender difference in income and bonuses. 
The education variable indicates that women are higher educated than men, because a much larger 
proportion of them has obtained an MA degree (but less a PhD degree), as can be seen in table 2. The 
difference, however, is not statistically significant. Table 3 shows, as expected from the data summarized 
in the previous two tables that men earn more than women, and the difference is statistically significant. 
Tables 4 and 5 show the cross tabulation for sex and bonuses before and after the crisis. Interestingly, the 
relationship was not statistically significant before the crisis but has become statistically significant after 
the crisis. Men earn higher bonuses than women and even more so after the crisis. Moreover, with the 
enormous losses in the financial sector during the crisis, men have succeeded better in keeping their 
bonuses than women. So, with more scarcity of resources available for bonuses, gender seems to matter 
for who manages to get a bonus.  
 
Tables 1 – 5 here 
 
LSH dimension one: risk attitude 
During the crisis but also well before it broke out, women fund managers in the US have 
performed better than their male colleagues (Chang, 2010). Chang refers to an internal study 
done by AsiaHedge concluding that female fund managers in the AsiaHedge Composite Index 
scored 73% better than their male colleagues between 2000 and 2007, and a report by Hedge 
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Fund Research showing that women performed 56% better than men in the period 2000 until 
May 2009, whereas during the height of the crisis in the second half of 2008, men lost twice as 
much as women. A recent study on mutual fund management in Egypt shows that women 
perform better than men in an emerging market (Ahmed Azmi, 2008). A study among 649 fund 
managers in four countries confirms that women are more risk averse than men (Beckmann and 
Menkhoff, 2008). A large study on gender differences in the mutual funds industry in the US 
does not find statistically significance performance differences, but it does show that female fund 
managers follow more stable investment styles and show a higher performance persistence 
(Niessen and Ruenzi, 2005). Linked to this, a recent survey by a major UK investment bank, 
among 2000 wealthy clients in twenty countries showed not only that women invest more risk 
averse, but also that they place more importance on financial discipline than men (Barclays 
Wealth, 2011).  
These gender differences in financial performance are supported by many studies on risk 
in experimental economics, showing that on average women take less risk than men (see for an 
in-depth review of experimental research on gender and risk: Croson and Gneezy, 2009)
2
. As a 
consequence, under conditions of high volatility women perform better than men because they 
take lower risk or take more time to study risks or include a wider variety of risk factors than men 
do. Whereas under conditions of relative stability of financial markets men would perform better 
than women, although this is not necessarily the case (see for example van den Bos, Harteveld 
and Stoop, 2009). A famous study by Barber and Odean (2001) using survey data from 35,000 
US households on their portfolio investment behaviour, has shown that women performed even 
better under normal conditions of financial markets, controlling for risk diversification in 
portfolio choice. Men traded 45% more often than women, who tried less to beat the market, 
which prevented them from unnecessary and costly trading. Hence, women’s transaction costs 
were lower, leading to higher net returns on investment. In couples, men’s returns were 1.4 
percent lower, whereas comparing the behavior of singles, men earned 2.3 percent less in returns. 
This finding on less trading by women was recently confirmed in a survey among 2,000 wealthy 
individuals (Barclays Wealth, 2011). This report also indicated that women use partly different 
strategies of financial discipline than men: they more often use cooling-off periods and they more 
often avoid information about markets that may lead to deviate them from their long term 
strategies. Hence, women seem to be less over-confident than men in their investment behavior. 
Moreover, women seem to behave more contextually. A survey among fund managers 
found that women change their strategy more often when they are ahead of or behind the market 
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– “they try to perform closer to the market development than men” (Beckmann and Menkhoff, 
2008: 377). A study on pension fund investment indicates that women tend to diversity their 
portfolio slightly more than men, and are less likely to sell when markets are down (Vanguard, 
2011). However, in a study using a large database on chess playing, it was found that men adapt 
their strategy when playing against women, whereas women do not (Gerdes and Gränsmark, 
2010). Apparently, men are more sensitive to a gender difference between players than women. 
Men appear to play a more aggressive strategy when playing against women, and this effect is 
even stronger when a male player is on objective grounds (measured with the so called Elo 
rating) weaker than a female player. This reaction to women by male players reduces their 
winning probabilities, controlling for various other factors: a solid strategy has a 1.5 percentage 
point higher probability of winning as compared to an aggressive strategy, a difference which is 
statistically significant. Again, this points at over-confidence among males in risky, strategic 
settings. 
Another type of empirical literature that is interesting in this respect comes from 
experimental social psychology, indicating that abstract thinking increases one’s sense of power 
(Smith, Wigboldus and Dijksterhuis, 2008). This ties in with a study in psychoanalytics, arguing 
that financial assets tend to be regarded as ‘phantastic objects’, leading traders to ignore risks 
(Tuckett and Taffler, 2008). When markets move upwards, this unconscious belief in a mental 
representation of something that fulfills the trader’s deepest desires to have what he wants and 
when he wants it, “leads to a growing excitement and a belief in a more and more contagious new 
reality (idem, p. 406)”. The authors explain that “when the bubble bursts this is not due to new 
information; rather it seems the dizzy heights reached create an accumulation of split-off anxiety” 
(ibid.). The authors also suggest that this psychoanalytical approach helps to explain why anger 
and blame rather than guilt erupt in the aftermath of the crisis. 
During the heights of the financial crisis it are the jobs that require most abstract thinking 
– trading, modeling, and developing derivatives – that appeared to be the most harmful, 
expressing excessive risk. And it is precisely those jobs that are the most powerful as they 
provide the opportunity to gain huge bonuses and to attain prestige – and they are least occupied 
by women
3
. When women fund managers were asked to reflect on the differences between their 
and their male colleagues’ strategies when the crisis broke out, they often replied that the men 
either just waited for the storm to get over or they kept on trading as before, whereas the women 
spent more time on research before they would take a decision (NCRW, 2009). 
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The findings reviewed above are not necessarily driven by nature – these are precisely 
the key features of the investment strategy of Warren Buffet, portrayed recently in a book under 
the title Warren Buffett Invests Like a Girl – and Why You Should, Too (Lofton, 2011)4. Indeed, it 
is not only experimental economists and other academics who come up with gender differences 
in financial behavior. The financial sector itself is increasingly aware of these differences, though 
only very slowly following up on these, with the top of the sector protecting its interests by 
keeping the circle of hiring and promotion largely within the old boys’ network5. The nurture 
explanation suggests that women’s socialization into societal norms about proper behavior for 
women as compared to men leads them to take lower risks, to have more self-constraint, and to 
react more contextually to changes in the market. This is supported by a recent study by Booth 
and Nolen (2012) who found that girls in single-sex schools exhibit the same levels of risk in 
games as boys, whereas girls in coed schools take lower risk levels. “Adolescent females, even 
those endowed with an intrinsic propensity to make riskier choices, may be discouraged from 
doing so because they are inhibited by culturally driven norms and beliefs about the appropriate 
mode of female behavior – avoiding risk. But once they are placed in an all-female environment, 
this inhibition is reduced. No longer reminded of their own gender identity and society’s norms, 
they find it easier to make riskier choices than women who are placed in a coed class (idem, p. 
F74)”. 
The nature dimension finds support in the empirical literature too. This has been 
analyzed in particular in neuroeconomics. A key study is among 17 male London City traders, 
testing for the relationship between two hormones, testosterone and cortisol, on the one hand and 
financial decision making and returns on the other hand (Coates and Herbert, 2008, and for a 
more general interpretation see Coates, Gurnell and Sarnyai, 2010). Testosterone is known in the 
literature for the ‘winner effect’, because it increases confidence and risk taking. Cortisol is 
sensitive to situations of uncontrollability and uncertainty, while it also affects the immune 
system. The traders traded in many assets but mostly in German interest rate futures, closing their 
trades at the end of the day, and were followed for eight consecutive business days. Saliva 
samples were taken twice a day (at 11 am and 4 pm) and profits and losses were recorded at the 
same time. The study found that daily testosterone was significantly higher when they made 
above average profits. Also, on days of higher morning testosterone levels, traders made higher 
profits for the rest of the day than on lower testosterone days. The authors conclude that “because 
the days of high 11 am testosterone were different for each trader, thereby ruling out any general 
market effects on both testosterone and profits and losses, our results suggest that high morning 
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testosterone predicts greater profitability for the rest of that day” (Coates and Herbert, 2008, p. 
6168). On cortisol, the study found that the more volatile a trader’s profits and losses, the higher 
were his average daily cortisol levels as well as the standard deviation in cortisol. This suggests, 
according to the authors, “that individual levels of cortisol relate not to the rate of economic 
return, as does testosterone, but to the variance of return” (idem, p. 6169). Cortisol rose in 38% 
of the subjects’ days, sometimes up to 500%. Also, cortisol correlated strongly and positively 
with the volatility of the interest rate of the German Bund, while testosterone did not. The authors 
signal potential negative effects for financial markets from their findings. First, when testosterone 
is chronically elevated, the literature indicates that it no longer has positive effects, but instead 
increases impulsivity and harmful risk taking, as well as euphoria and mania, and becomes 
addictive. This may exaggerate a market’s upward movement. Second, chronically elevated 
levels of cortisol stimulate anxiety and a tendency to find threat and risk where none exist, which 
may exaggerate a market’s downward movement. Together, the behavioural effects of these 
hormones may strengthen market volatility, and “help explain why people caught up in bubbles 
and crashes often find it difficult to make rational choices” (idem, p. 6171). 
The mentioning of ‘people’ in the last quote is interesting, given the fact that the sample 
only contains males. It may well be, of course, that women would express similar behavioral 
reactions to similar levels and changes in the two hormones. But the fact is that women’s 
testosterone levels are much lower than men’s, whereas, even though their cortisol levels are 
similar, women’s bodies react much more to higher cortisol levels with the secretion of the 
hormone oxytocin than men’s bodies, a hormone that counters the production of cortisol and 
promotes nurturing and relaxing emotions (Nazario, n.d.). A study on oxytocin and altruism, 
among a double-blind placebo-controlled sample of 96 male students in a public goods game has 
shown that receiving oxytocin (through a nose spray) is positively correlated with the willingness 
to cooperate and the expectation that others will cooperate (Israel et. al, 2012). This suggests that 
oxytocin indeed may have positive economic effects in a context of uncertainty, stress and 
anxiety-based herd behaviour. In line with these findings, a review article on the neurological 
foundations of economic choice concludes that the cognitive control processed by the 
dorsolateral prefontal cortex of the brain is impaired during stress and depleted with repeated use 
(Fehr and Rangel, 2011). The authors conclude that “this predicts that subjects are more likely to 
make short-sighted decisions under stress” (idem, p. 24). So, in order to reduce increasing risk 
levels and market volatility in financial markets, a better gender-balance on trading floors seems 
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meaningful, both physically by replacing some male traders with female traders, and chemically, 
by administering oxytocin to male traders when market volatility increases … 
  
 The survey among Dutch financial professionals asked first about the subjective risk level 
respondents take before and after the crisis. Diagram 1 below shows that more men take very high risk 
and more women take very low risk, with the gender difference becoming stronger after the crisis. This 
result confirms the findings in the empirical literature on gender differences in risk taking, as was also 
discussed above. But there is more to the gender difference in risk attitudes. The diagram also shows that 
men more often take neutral risk levels, before and after the crisis, whereas more women take high and 
low risks, before and after the crisis. In other words, women express a higher spread of risk, whereas men 
opt more often for a less context-specific, default risk level or a very high risk category. The gender 
differences are statistically significant for the data after the crisis, not before. So, with more volatility in 
the financial market, women adjust their risk attitude more than men. However, when asked whether they 
adjust their risk levels when markets become volatile, both men and women respond that they adjust risk 
levels downwards, men claim to do so more often than women state this, as table 6 indicates, although the 
gender difference is not statistically significant. Men apparently overstate their risk aversion during a 
crisis. A similar effect of overstatement that has been demonstrated in hypothetical public goods games 
versus real games. Brown and Taylor (2000) found in such an experimental setting that men overstate 
their contributions in a hypothetical public goods game three times more than women. Apparently, men 
not only show over-confidence in their risk attitude but also they do not seem to be aware of this. 
 The conclusion from the gender analysis of behavioural strategies in relation to risk attitudes is that 
in this sample of Dutch financial professionals, women are slightly more risk averse than men. Moreover, 
men state, to a similar extent as women, that they adjust their risk levels downward during a crisis, but 
women appear to do that more in practice, and show a higher spread of actual risk profiles. This suggests 
more contextual risk behaviour by women as compared to men and more overconfidence among men, 
who do not seem to be aware of this. Both findings are consistent with the empirical literature reviewed 
above, but need further exploration beyond this exploratory survey. 
 
Figure 1 and table 6 here 
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LHS dimension two: rules & responsibility 
Experimental game theory has consistently shown than women are more cooperative than men 
(Croson and Gneezy, 2009). This has been shown with well known games that test for attitudes 
that have a combined moral as well as social dimensions, such as the dictator game, the 
ultimatum game, the prisoner’s dilemma and the public good game. Moreover, varying game 
conditions such as a change in the members of the group or information about players, appear to 
have more effect on women’s strategies than on men’s strategies. This suggests that women’s 
reasoning in complex situations is more contextual than men’s. Such contextual reasoning in 
complex social settings, involving ethical implications, is a major characteristic of the ethics of 
care, developed by Caroll Gilligan. Indeed, Croson and Gneezy (2009: 464) conclude: “we 
believe, as suggested by Gilligan (1982), that men’s decisions are less context-specific than 
women’s.” 
The ethics of care is attentive to the inter-personal level, where ethics is concerned with 
sustaining human relationships and preventing harm to others (Waerness 2009). In the financial 
sector this can be done, for example, by recognizing the limited financial means of some people, 
recognizing risks that individuals, families or firms run, or recognizing how certain institutions 
that emerged, like systems of reward, may tempt people to behave irresponsibly in the knowledge 
that this will not be punished. Context, then, refers to livelihood, risk, and perverse incentives. In 
the ethics of care, preventing harm to others is contextualized and requires taking responsibility 
for the consequences of one’s actions. Not only as an individual but also through institutions, and 
responsibility for preventing the system in which one functions to turn into an uncontrollable 
chaos causing harm to all involved. Hence, put in this frame, the ethics of care can be used to 
analyze the financial system and banks operating in that system. 
There is only very limited empirical literature testing for gender differences in moral 
behaviour in firms (see, for a few studies, Robinson et. al, 2000; Dreber and Johannesson, 2008). 
However, a recent experimental study with 96 MBA students (33% female) on buyer-seller 
information asymmetry has done a revealing test for understanding gender differences in ethical 
behavior before the outbreak of the financial crisis (Kray and Haselhuhn, 2011). The study finds 
that male participants more often identify with the interests of a buyer or a seller, changing their 
attitude towards sharing of asymmetric information, depending on whether they were assigned 
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the sellers role or the buyers role. Female participants more often identify with what they 
consider to be a fair relationship between buyer and seller, i.e. revealing asymmetric information, 
irrespective whether they take the buyer’s role or the seller’s role. The differences were found to 
be statistically significant and indicate that women’s ethical attitude in a market relationship is 
more cooperative and oriented towards ‘fair play’, whereas men’s ethical attitude is more 
competitive and oriented towards protecting the interests of the market side that they represent. 
These results have led the authors to test a variant of the LSH: “We began by asking whether a 
hypothetical Bernadette Madoff would have committed the same infamously unethical actions as 
the real Bernie. The current research suggests not and importantly, offers an explanation as to 
why not. Though men and women may share common social and achievement motivations, they 
appear to differ in the extent to which their experiences and beliefs are called upon to set ethical 
standards. By relying more heavily on their motivations, men derive considerable leeway in 
setting ethical standards, rendering them more vulnerable to ethical lapses” (Kray and Haselhuhn, 
2011, p. 12). So, the literature indicates that women are not only, on average, more cooperative 
than men, they also let their behavior be guided more by what they perceive as morally good in 
relation to particular others in a particular context as compared to men. This suggests that women 
would be more than men inclined towards responsible behavior when relationships with others 
are involved. 
 
Turning to the exploratory survey results, I find that more men (24.3%) than women (10.8%) place high 
trust in the effectiveness of regulation, and for national regulation the gender difference is statistically 
significant (see Table 7). This relates to the gender differences in ethical reasoning referred to in the 
literature: whereas women tend to place more trust in a personal, contextual ethics, men tend to place 
more trust in an abstract, universal ethics, as is expressed by Central Bank regulation. 
 
Table 7 here 
 
There is a stark contrast in the answers by men and women to the question whether Dutch banks have 
become too big to fail, as table 8 shows. The three top Dutch banks (ABN Amro, ING, and Rabobank) 
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each have a balance total higher than Dutch GDP. One of these received much state support and another 
one was nationalized. The majority of men agree that these banks have become too big to fail, whereas 
the majority of women disagree (see Table 8). The interpretation of the gender difference is not 
straightforward. Perhaps women see no problem in TBTF in the abstract, but trust that responsible 
behavior by any bank, big or small, will help to prevent problems. 
 
Table 8 here 
 
The two diagrams below show the answers to two questions that directly concern responsibility. A clear 
majority of women (61%) feel that their bosses should have acted more responsibly before the crisis, 
against nearly half of the men (49%). When asked about their own failures, the respondents show less 
responsibility. Women, however, feel more responsible than men, 27% versus 22%. The gender 
differences in these responses support the findings in the literature, indicating that female financial 
professionals are more likely than their male counterparts to weigh moral values in relationships heavier 
vis-à-vis their interests as sellers of financial products. The gender differences found in the responses to 
this survey question, however, are not statistically significant. 
 
Diagrams 2 and 3 here 
 
LSH dimension three: leadership 
Already well before the crisis broke out we see an interesting gender issue concerning well-
known whistle blowers. In 1997 it was Brooksley Born, chair of the US Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission who called Congress for derivatives regulation (Chang, 2010). Her voice, 
however, was silenced while increasingly non-transparent and complex derivatives and securities 
were being developed. In 2006 it was Sheila Bair, chair of the US Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, who warned against nonperforming mortgages (idem). Also she was ignored. Again 
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in 2006, Madelyn Antoncic, risk manager at Lehman Brothers, warned against too high risk 
levels taken in her bank. She was sidelined, just a year before the bank collapsed (The 
Economist, 2010). Male whistle blowers were also ignored, but they were further away from the 
fire, they were academics, such as Steve Keen and Nouriel Roubini
6
. But it is striking to see that 
the three women who gave serious warnings and called for change had top positions within the 
financial sector, they were insiders, and yet they were ignored or pushed aside. 
Women are scarce in leadership positions everywhere, and even more so in finance. The 
explanations for this under-representation include gender stereotypes about power and leadership, 
which prevent women from reaching top positions (Ridgeway, 2001; van Vianen and Fischer, 
2002; Acker, 2006; Ely and Padavic, 2007). Moreover, such stereotyping also tends to make it 
hard to earn respect and to remain at the top, as Joan Acker (2006: 447) explains: “women 
enacting power violate conventions of relative subordination to men”. After the crisis broke out, 
however, we see several financial leadership positions being filled with women. We now have 
female Ministers of Finance in Spain, a female Central Bank President in Iceland and female 
CEOs of Iceland’s main banks, as well as in various other countries, while in the US, Mary 
Schapiro was appointed chair of the SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) and the 
president of the IMF is a woman, Christine Lagarde, for the first time since the organization’s 
existence. 
But the fact that we see now women cleaning up the mess that men left behind, may not 
only be a sign of an acknowledgement of women’s better performance in financial leadership, but 
also a reflection of the hope that they will bring the situation back to normal, which may then 
lead to replacement of these women by men and their business as usual. The economic literature 
has an explanation for this phenomenon, namely the glass cliff: in times of high uncertainty, 
women get more often the chance to take up a top position than in normal times, precisely 
because of the risk of failure under volatile circumstances. Cleaning up a mess is certainly an 
expression of caring – mending the web of relations as the ethics of care scholar Joan Tronto 
(1993) would say. But it may not serve the women themselves, after the job is done and the 
sector is back on track – it is relatively easy to find a reason to push these women over the cliff, 
since they had to fire and punish some of their (largely male) subordinates. It may well be that 
when financial markets stabilize the old boys’ network will tighten around them as before. 
Literature on the glass cliff precisely points at this to happen when women are appointed in top 
positions that are fragile. Interestingly, this phenomenon was also found during a financial 
downturn in an empirical study by Ryan and Haslam, (2005). They compared firms listed at the 
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London Stock Exchange with higher ratios of women in the board with firms that had fewer 
women on boards. They found that “in a time of a general financial downturn in the stock market, 
companies that appointed a woman had experienced consistently poor performance in the months 
preceding the appointment” (Ryan and Haslam, 2005: 86). They conclude that “such women can 
be seen to be placed on top of a ‘glass cliff’, in the sense that their leadership appointments are 
made in problematic organizational circumstances and hence are more precarious” (ibid p. 87). 
The empirical management literature on women and leadership indicates that women are 
not worse leaders than men. McKinsey & Company (2007) have shown that of 89 European 
listed companies firms with more women on the board had better financial performance than 
firms with less women in executive boards. Good management decisions are complex and 
therefore require a diverse team to take all relevant factors into account, as has been recognized 
in the law of requisite variety (Ashby, 1958)
7
. A recent study using assessments of over 7,000 
managers and executives from successful companies worldwide, of which 36% was female, 
found that in the majority of areas women were higher rated than men, including in finance and 
accounting (Zenger and Folkman, 2012). The ratings were constructed on the basis of, on 
average, 13 respondents, such as managers and peers. When disaggregating leadership 
performance into 16 leadership competences, female leaders were statistically significantly rated 
better in 12 of these than men. For example, they scored higher on the following detailed survey 
items: “follow through on commitments”, “willingly goes above and beyond”, “improves based 
on feedback from others”. Interestingly, the gender differences in leadership competences do not, 
at first sight, reflect gender stereotypes about leadership – they score statistically significantly 
better on 75% of the items, most of which are not typically regarded as feminine. For example, 
the biggest male-female differences were found in the competences of “Takes Initiative” and 
“Drives for Results”, which are commonly seen as masculine characteristics rather than feminine 
ones. Female leaders also scored much higher on the only explicit ethical competence that was 
included, namely “Displays High Integrity and Honesty”, as well as on relational dimensions 
involving ethics, namely “Develops Others” and “Builds Relationships”. The only competence in 
which male leaders were rated statistically significantly higher was “Develops Strategic 
Perspective”. 
These findings can be interpreted tentatively in the light of the findings reviewed earlier 
in this paper. The gender differences do not reflect common stereotypes about masculinity and 
femininity, but rather seem to relate to the distinction between contextual ethics, concerned with 
relationships, flexibility, fort-righteousness, and self-discipline, that was found to be more related 
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to women than to men in the empirical literature and the exploratory survey results. This 
interpretation receives support from another empirical study of over 13,000 managers (27% 
female) who were rated by 64,000 subordinates (van Emmerik et. al, 2008). The study clustered a 
wide variety of leadership characteristics into two stereotypical categories, namely 
‘consideration’, generally regarded as feminine, and ‘initiating’, generally regarded as masculine. 
The two leadership styles were negatively correlated. Interestingly, the authors found that both 
types of leadership behaviors are more strongly expressed by female leaders than by male 
leaders. The authors conclude therefore that “Female managers worldwide combine ‘soft’ with 
‘hard’ leadership behaviors. One might speculate that female managers actually do a better job 
worldwide, as they deploy both more consideration and more initiating structure” (idem, p, 310). 
The findings reviewed above do raise the question to what extent an increase in female 
leadership in the financial sector is supported by those who work in the sector. The survey 
included two questions on this issue. 
 
Table 9 and 10 here 
 
Tables 9 and 10 show large differences between male and female respondents in support for 
women in financial top positions. Both men and women agree that more women should be hired 
at the financial top when they have equal education and experience, but women agree more than 
men. Only half of the men think that more female leadership would help to prevent a next crisis, 
whereas the large majority of women agrees that this would be the case. Apparently, men do not 
see much benefit of gender diversity in leadership in the financial sector, or they fear for their 
own careers. 
A recent paper by Lyda Bigelow et. al (2012) analyzed whether investors have equal 
confidence in female and male CEOs. The experimental set-up among 222 MBA students used 
hypothetical descriptions of CEOs that only differed in the sex of the CEO. The experiment has 
shown that “despite being identical in the experiment, the abilities and experience of female 
CEOs were evaluated more negatively than those of male CEOs (p. 20).” The authors suggest 
that the market does not see gender diversity in top management as a predictor of potentially 
better performance due to gender-biased perceptions about female leadership.  
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In conclusion, it seems that among business administration students and professionals in 
the financial sector gender stereotypes about female managers’ capacities are stronger than the 
actual ratings of female managers’ performance, which helps to explain the strength of the glass 
ceiling in finance, as well as the phenomenon of the glass cliff during the financial crisis and its 
aftermath. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
The Lehman Sisters Hypothesis has received strong symbolic meaning in debates on the behavioural 
dimensions behind the financial crisis. My analysis of the empirical literature on gender differences in 
risk attitudes, rules and responsibility, and leadership, combined with the findings of an exploratory 
survey among financial professionals, finds empirical support for the hypothesis. Women were found to 
be more risk averse, less overconfident with less inclination to beat the market, and applying a wider 
range of strategies in risky situations including more self-discipline. Moreover, women and men react in a 
stereotypical way when they need to make decisions in a context with the other sex present or as 
opponent: men take higher risks whereas women act more risk averse than they would do in a same-sex 
context. In addition, men’s higher testosterone levels and women’s higher oxytocin response to the stress 
hormone cortisol help to explain why male-dominated trading floors may exacerbate market volatility, 
whereas female investors of hedge funds, wealth management and household portfolios earn higher 
returns on investment than their male counterparts. The literature and survey results also indicated that 
women act more contextual in complex situations, and are less supportive of universal rules, such as 
regulation of the financial sector. This contextual reasoning by women also has moral dimensions, namely 
a stronger focus on responsibility in relationships as compared to adhering to self-interest. Finally, the 
recent empirical literature on gender and leadership shows that the phenomena of the glass ceiling and the 
glass cliff still operate, despite the fact that female leaders are evaluated more positively than male 
leaders. Also here, gender stereotypes play a role. When same-quality male and female leaders were 
compared in hypothetical situations, female leaders were undervalued, but when actual managers’ skills 
were rated, the female leaders came out as better leaders. This was found to be caused by a better balance 
between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ skills among female leaders. Apparently, leadership is still connected with what 
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people belief to be masculine values, and hence, more connected with men. This gendered belief, together 
with other factors such as the protection of their careers by male financial professionals, most likely limits 
the support among males for female leadership in the financial sector.  
 This brings me to a last issue raised by the literature review, namely the nature-nurture debate. 
The empirical literature reviewed above indicates that both nature and nurture affect gender differences in 
risk attitudes, cooperation, responsibility, and leadership. Interestingly, recent literature on these 
mechanisms increasingly suggests that nature and nurture are not independent but related (Taylor, 2001; 
Roughgarden, 2004). Shelley Taylor (2001) has brought together research into the linkages between 
sociology, biology, and psychology, among humans as well as among primates, arguing that women tend 
to have stronger caring bonds than men. Women have more and closer friendships, indicating that 
sympathy may, on average, be a stronger trait among women than among men, which is most likely 
generated by a combination of nature and nurture, Taylor argues. Women’s groups are generally 
horizontally organized as supportive networks, which cooperate for food and childcare. Men’s groups are 
generally threatened by power plays because they are organized as hierarchies, which facilitates defense, 
attack and hunting. This helps to understand why men’s moral goals are more often related to showing 
competences, including taking higher risk and showing ore aggression, whereas women’s moral goals are 
more often related to affirming relatedness, implying self-discipline and responsibility. Obviously these 
are crude generalizations and mere group averages, just like the average sex differences in height or brain 
size. The combined insights from both the social sciences and the natural sciences make the variations 
found in financial behavior between men and women more understandable, I think, than limiting 
explanations to either nature or nurture – in particular because the two are most likely related. 
 In conclusion, the Lehman Sisters Hypothesis clearly finds support in the empirical literature on 
the three main behavioural dimensions behind the hypothesis and in the findings from the explorative 
survey among Dutch financial professionals. But further research is necessary, in particular on the ethical 
dimensions, the interaction effects between males and females, the constraints for women leaders in 
banking, and underlying this all, the nature-nurture interrelatedness of the behavioural economic and 
neuroeconomic findings. The Lehman Sisters Hypothesis has set an exciting research agenda for pluralist 
economists and I invite you all to join me in this challenging endeavor. 
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Tables & Figures 
 
 
Table 1. Age differences between men and women (%) 
 21-30 
years 
31-40 
years 
41-50 
years 
51-60 
years 
61-+ 
years 
Total 
Female 6.8 47.3 37.8 8.1 0 100 
Male 2.7 43.2 27.0 24.3 2.7 100 
Total 5.4 45.9 34.2 13.5 0.9 100 
Pearson Chi Square test is statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
Table 2. Educational differences between men and women (%) 
 Highschool Specialised 
training 
BA MA PhD Total 
Female 2.7 9.5 13.5 63.5 10.8 100 
Male 5.4 13.5 16.2 48.6 16.2 100 
Total 3.6 10.8 14.4 58.6 12.6 100 
Pearson Chi Square test is not statistically significant. 
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Table 3. Income differences between men and women in euro per month (%) 
 < 5,000 5,000 – 
10,000 
10,000 – 
15,000 
15,000 – 
20,000 
20,000 > Total 
Female 24.3 59.5 12.2 0.0 4.1 100 
Male 21.6 37.8 21.6 5.4 13.5 100 
Total 23.4 52.3 15.3 1.8 7.2 100 
Pearson Chi Square test is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
 
Table 4. Differences in bonus between men and women in euro in 2007 (%) 
 No 
bonus 
< 
10,000 
10,000 – 
100,000 
100,000 – 
500,000 
Total 
Female 32.4 36.5 29.7 1.4 100 
Male 27.0 29.7 37.8 5.4 100 
Total 30.6 34.2 32.4 2.7 100 
Pearson Chi Square test is not statistically significant. 
 
Table 5. Differences in bonus between men and women in euro in 2009 (%) 
 No 
bonus 
< 
10,000 
10,000 – 
100,000 
100,000 – 
500,000 
Total 
Female 48.6 31.1 18.9 1.4 100 
Male 35.1 21.6 40.5 2.7 100 
Total 44.1 27.9 26.1 1.8 100 
Pearson Chi Square test is statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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Diagram 1. Risk taking before and after the crisis (%) 
Pearson Chi Square test is not statistically significant for 2007 but is statistically significant at the 10% 
level for 2009. 
 
Table 6. Downward risk adjustment in volatile markets (%) 
 Yes No Total 
Female 62.2 37.8 100 
Male 70.3 29.7 100 
Total 64.9 35.1 100 
Pearson Chi Square test is not statistically significant. 
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Table 7. Do you think more national regulation helps to prevent a crisis? (%) 
 Somewhat Strongly Total 
Female 89.2 10.8 100 
Male 75.7 24.3 100 
Total 84.7 15.3 100 
Pearson Chi Square test is statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
Table 8. Have Dutch banks become too big to fail? (%) 
 Yes No Total 
Female 45.9 54.1 100 
Male 64.9 35.1 100 
Total 52.3 47.7 100 
Pearson Chi Square test is statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
Diagram 2.  Responsibility of boss (%) 
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Diagram 3. Responsibility of oneself (%) 
 
 
Table 9. Should more women be hired at the financial top*? (%) 
 Yes No Total 
Female 97.3 2.7 100 
Male 81.1 18.9 100 
Total 91.9 8.1 100 
Pearson Chi Square test is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
* Note: the question included the addition “when they have the same level of education and experience as 
men”. 
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Table 10. Would more female leadership prevent a next crisis? (%) 
 Yes No Total 
Female 86.5 13.5 100 
Male 51.4 48.6 100 
Total 74.8 25.2 100 
Pearson Chi Square test is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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Notes 
 
                                                 
1
 I found only one paper that did an empirical test of the LSH. It compares female and male investors in online peer-
to-peer lending and does not find statistically significant differences in risk and portfolio performance (Barasinska, 
2010). On the other hand, a study with a more limited scope, testing for gender differences among fund managers, 
rejects the null hypothesis of no statistically significant gender differences – the authors argue that women in finance 
do behave differently from men in some, though not all, behavioural aspects, despite the self-selection mechanism. 
(Beckmann and Menkhoff, 2008). 
2
 A recent report by the Deutsche Bundesbank on gender and age composition in boards of banks finds that banks 
increase their levels of risk when there are more women on the board (Berger, Kick and Schaeck, 2012). This 
contradicts the findings of most empirical and experimental research on gender and risk attitudes. The report does 
not give an explanation for its findings but admits that there may be a relationship with age and experience for 
which it did not control. I suggest that the result may well be a consequence of men’s reaction to the entry of women 
in boards. They may exhibit typical macho behaviour, signalling to the women that they are ‘real men’, increasing 
their levels of risk. This potential explanation is supported by a recent study with data from online chess playing 
with 15,000 players and 1.4 million games and 15% women. It found that when men play against women, they 
choose more aggressive strategies, even though such strategies reduce their winning probability (Gerdes and 
Gränsmark, 2010). Further analysis into male reactions to women entering a male domain is necessary before any 
conclusions can be drawn on whether a change in risk profile of a bank is driven by an increase in women on the 
board or by an over-reaction of the males on those boards to the entry of women in a traditionally all-male domain. 
3
 In May 2012, JP Morgan Chase revealed that one of its traders in London, with the nickname of the London 
Whale, had caused a loss of 2 billion dollar, not through fraud but within the bank’s rules and oversight regulations. 
The Chief Investment Officer under whom this trader works, Ina Drew, a woman known for her risk aversion, 
resigned as a consequence. On the other hand, there were a few women involved in the creation and evaluation of 
toxic assets. TIME features a list of the 25 people who are to blame for the crisis, which includes two women, 
Kathleen Corbet who ran the largest rating agency, Standard & Poor’s during most of the years preceding the crisis, 
and Marion Sandler who, together with her husband Herb Sandler were the first to offer tricky home loans back in 
the 1980s. 
4
 Lofton gives the following three-point advise to investors based on Buffett’s experience and attitude: (1) Value and 
cultivate your relationships with people (2) Learn from the masters, but be willing to question them (3) Be fair and 
operate in an ethical manner. 
5
 An interesting example of a sector response to the insight of higher female financial performance is a new private 
equity fund set up by three women in the Netherlands, Karmijn Kapitaal, investing only in medium scale firms that 
have women on the board. See: http://www.karmijnkapitaal.nl/en/ 
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6
 Keen and Roubini have won the Revere Award for being economists who have publicly warned for the crisis. 
http://rwer.wordpress.com/2010/05/13/keen-roubini-and-baker-win-revere-award-for-economics-2/ 
7
 This law states that high variation in context can only be adequately dealt with through high variation in decision  
making. Or, more formally, the larger the variety of actions available to a control system, the larger the variety of 
perturbations it is able to compensate. This implies that in volatile environments such as financial markets diverse 
management teams would be better equipped to deal with crises and their prevention than homogeneous teams. 
